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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
David McPeak appeals from his judgment of conviction for burglary, possession
of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), and possession of a controlled
substance (marijuana). He asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to
suppress because the traffic stop was made without reasonable, articulable suspicion,
and that the district court abused its discretion by imposing excessive sentences on his
felony convictions.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The following facts are taken from the hearing on Mr. McPeak's motion to
suppress. At approximately 11 :50 p.m. on August 29, 2012, Officer Joshua Bridges
received a report of an assault on Brookside Street, "which was in the general direction"
he was heading. (Tr., p.16, Ls.19-24.) It was reported that a "male came into a house
and left in a white Ford pickup truck. That was the only information I had at the time."
(Tr., p.17, Ls.15-18.)

He clarified that the male was identified as David McPeak.

(Tr., p.17, Ls.21-22.)
Officer Bridges saw a white Ford pickup truck "at the intersection of Linden and
Ohio which is just to the west of the intersection of Linden and Indiana. It was heading
towards me." (Tr., p.18, Ls.14-17.) He tried to read the license plate to see "who it
came back to." (Tr., p.18, Ls.20-21.) Officer Bridges pulled in behind the vehicle, which
"slowed down to a pace of about 15 miles an hour and then made an abrupt right-hand
turn onto Maple, then it slowed to five miles an hour and then just stopped on the side of
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the road."

(Tr., p.19, Ls.1-5.)

After the vehicle stopped on Maple, Officer Bridges

placed his spotlight on it, and saw that the occupants were "shifting around a bit."
(Tr.,p.19, Ls.11-15.)

He then activated his lights to initiate "a high risk traffic stop."

(Tr., p.19, Ls.11-15.)
Officer Bridges acknowledged that he was looking for a truck being driven by one
person when it fact there were three people in the white Ford. (Tr., p.21, L.24 - p.22,
L.2.) He also testified that he was taking a "highly educated guess" as to whether this
was the truck that had been involved on the incident at Brookside. (Tr., p.22, Ls.2-7.)
He also acknowledged that there were potentially "hundreds, maybe thousands" of
white trucks registered in Idaho. (Tr., p.21, Ls:17-20.)
\/\/hen Officer Bridges approached the vehicle, he found several knives and
detected the smell of burnt marijuana. (Tr., p.23, L.7 - p.25, L.11.) He eventually found
a bag that contained a white crystal substance that field-tested positive for
methamphetamine. (Tr., p.28, Ls.7-11.)
Mr. McPeak was charged with burglary and aggravated assault for the alleged
incident on Brookside Street as well as possession of methamphetamine and
possession of marijuana based on the search of his vehicle.

(R., p.20.)

He filed a

motion to suppress, asserting that the stop and the search of his vehicle were illegal.
(R., p.33.)

He sought suppression of all of the evidence relating to the traffic stop.

(R, p.38.) The district court made the following findings with respect to the motion to
suppress:
So it seems like this breaks down into a couple of different things. One is
the defense motion is based on an improper stop. But as the court heard
the testimony and evidence in this case, the officer actually didn't initiate a
stop. The defendant himself stopped, and the officer stopped behind him.
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At that point when the spotlight goes on, I suppose at that point there's a
detention. And then of course when the overhead lights go it it seems
clear that he's being detained at that time. So he's detained with the
following probable cause evidence that the officer has at the time, and that
is he's had reported to him that there was an assault at a location,
although not a block away it's within the vicinity, that the vehicle leaving
the scene was a white Ford F-150 vehicle which he stopped behind.
There were unusual behavior [sic] going on with this Ford pickup, that is it
slowed to 15 miles an hour in a 35 miles an hour zone, turned the corner
and slowed to five miles an hour and actually stopped, and then there was
all sorts of movement inside the pickup which is all indicative of maybe
there's criminal activity afoot.
He's detained them for 30 seconds to a minute until the other officers
arrive. They're asked to exit the vehicle. And, indeed, the defendant is
identified as David McPeak, who apparently the person assault indentified
specifically as being David McPeak.
So now at this point in the time officer does have evidence to support
detention and also sees in plain sight three knives in the vehicle, which
again he was informed that there was a knife used in this assault, so
seizing those knives would be consistent with his ability to search the
vehicle for evidence of this assault that occurred earlier.
During the course of this search he smells even the faint odor of
marijuana. I guess when it gets right down to it does the smell of this faint
odor of marijuana give him the right to search the rest of the vehicle. The
court believes that the case law cited by the State in this case does
support that it did allow him at least to search for other contraband, other
illegal drugs in the vehicle. And, indeed, he did have the ability given the
probable cause of the assault to search the vehicle further for any other
weapons that might be evidence of this crime of assault that occurred
earlier in the evening.
So the motion, for those reasons, to suppress is denied.
(Tr., p.52, L.13 - p.54, L.11.) Following a jury trial, Mr. McPeak was found not guilty of
the aggravated assault but found guilty of the other charges. (R., p.94.) 1 The court
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Mr. McPeak was also charged, in a separate case, with malicious injury to property
and possession of drug paraphernalia. These cases were consolidated for trial but
Mr. McPeak only filed a notice of appeal in the instant case. Thus, he raises no claims
regarding these other two misdemeanors.
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imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, for the burglary charge,
and seven years indeterminate for possession of methamphetamine. (R., p.212.) The
court imposed 180 days for possession of marijuana. (R., p.200.) The court retained
jurisdiction for 365 days. (R., p.212.) Mr. McPeak appealed. (R., p.219.) He asserts
that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress and abused its discretion
by imposing excessive sentences.
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. McPeak's motion to suppress?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing excessive sentences?
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ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. McPeak's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. McPeak asserts that the traffic stop in this case was not supported by

reasonable, articulable suspicion and therefore the district court's order denying his
motion to suppress should be reversed.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated." State v. Holland,

135 Idaho 159, 161 (2000). When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged,
the appellate court should "accept the trial court's findings of fact which were supported
by substantial evidence, but freely review the application of constitutional principles to
the facts as found." Id.

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. McPeak's Motion To Suppress
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees "[t]he right

of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures ... " U.S. Const. amend IV. Article I, §17 of the
Idaho constitution provides a similar prohibition on unreasonable searches and
seizures. State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 848, 852 (2000). Therefore, warrantless searches
and seizures are per se unreasonable unless they fall into one of the "'few specifically
established and well delineated exceptions." Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366,
372 (1993) (quoting Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 19-20 (1984)). The State
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bears the burden of demonstrating a warrantless search or seizure falls into an
exception to the warrant requirement.

State v. Worthington, 138 Idaho 470, 472

(Ct. App. 2002).
This prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to
investigatory detentions of a person falling short of arrest, as well as formal arrests.

State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 6502002); State v. Knapp, 120 Idaho 346 (Ct. App.
1991 ). Although an arrest of an individual must be based on probable cause, police

may seize a person through an investigatory stop without probable cause, provided
there is a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
30 (1968); Knapp, 120 Idaho at 346-47; State v. Cook, 106 Idaho 209 (1984). If the
officer's suspicions are confirmed or furtt1er aroused, the stop may be prolonged and
the scope of the investigative stop enlarged. State v. Burgess, 104 Idaho 559 (Ct. App.
1983).

The standard of proof which an officer must satisfy in order to justify an

investigatory stop is to be judged by the "totality of the circumstances."

State v.

Haworth, 106 Idaho 405 (1984); see United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981);
State v. Cowen, 104 Idaho 649 (1983); State v. Post, 98 Idaho 834 (1978). The State
bears the burden of proving that an investigatory stop or detention is based on
reasonable suspicion and is limited in its scope and duration to the issue being
investigated. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 500 (1983).
A seizure occurs when officers detain someone through physical force or show of
authority. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843 (2004). To determine if someone has
been detained, the determination to be made is '"whether, under all the circumstances
surrounding an encounter, a reasonable person would have felt free to leave or
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otherwise decline the officer's requests and terminate the encounter."'

Id. (citing

State v. Reese, 132 Idaho 652, 654 (1999)). Mr. McPeak agrees with the district court

that he was seized once Officer Bridges activated his lights. However, he disagrees
that the stop was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion that the driver of the
vehicle was engaged in criminal activity.
"In order to satisfy constitutional standards, an investigative stop must be justified
by a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police, based upon specific articulable
facts, that the person to be seized has committed or is about to commit a crime."
State v. Sevy, 129 Idaho 613, 615 (Ct. App. 1997).

Reasonable suspicion may be

based on a message an officer receives from dispatch, rather than personal
observations, if the message was based upon facts that themselves give rise to
reasonable suspicion. Id. The reasonableness of the officer's suspicion is evaluated
based on the "totality of the circumstances at the time."

Id.

In other words, the

"collective knowledge" of all the officers and dispatchers involved. State v. Van Dome,
139 Idaho 961, 964 (Ct. App. 2004.)
This case is very similar to State v. Zapata-Reyes, 144 Idaho 703 (Ct. App.
2007).

In Zapata-Reyes, a resident called the police and reported that he was

concerned that his house may be shot at by three or four people in a "white Corsica, or
Buick like, a Pontiac."

Id. at 705.

The Court of Appeals held that the officer that

subsequently stopped the defendant lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion.
court explained:
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The

The caller indicated that he thought the occupants of a white passenger
vehicle, which he observed drive by his house twice, may shoot at his
house. He also stated that his house had been shot at two weeks
previously but provided no information connecting the suspicious white
passenger vehicle to the previous incident. The district court determined,
from listening to the audio tape of the call to dispatch, that three to four
minutes passed between when the call came into dispatch and when the
first officer spotted the white Oldsmobile within a block of the caller's
residence. The audio tape supports this finding, and we therefore accept
that the officer first observed the white Oldsmobile three to four minutes
after the call came into dispatch. However, the caller did not indicate how
much time had elapsed between when he last observed the suspicious
white vehicle and when he called dispatch. Additionally, the caller's
description of the suspicious vehicle was merely that it was a white
passenger car, maybe a Corsica or a Buick, and did not include a
license plate number. Although a call reporting a suspicious car with
uncommon characteristics, such as a purple car or one with unique
painting decals, may make the car identifiable without a license plate
number, the caller here described a car of a common color-whiteand provided no other significant distinguishing features. The
description was therefore not of a vehicle that was easily
distinguishable from other vehicles. No evidence was presented to
show whether the Oldsmobile that Zapata-Reyes occupied bore a
resemblance to any Corsicas or Buicks. Moreover, although not relayed to
the officers by dispatch, the caller indicated that there were three or four
occupants in the vehicle that passed by his residence, not two occupants
as in the Oldsmobile the officer followed and subsequently observed
Zapata-Reyes exit from. We conclude from the totality of the
circumstances that the officers did not possess a reasonable and
articulable suspicion that Zapata-Reyes had committed or was about to
commit a crime, and the officers therefore violated Zapata-Reyes' Fourth
Amendment rights by detaining him.
Id. at 708-09. The vehicle in Zapata-Reyes was described as a white passenger car; in

this case the description was a "white Ford pickup truck." Just as in Zapata-Reyes,
Officer Bridges was provided with no significant distinguishing features, and he
acknowledged that there were probably hundreds of white pickup trucks registered in
Idaho.
Further, the vehicle stopped by Officer Bridges carried three people and officer
Bridges was only given one suspect; the number of passengers did not even match. All
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Officer Bridges knew was that this was a white pickup truck "in the vicinity." This does
not constitute reasonable,

articulable suspicion -

it was, as Officer Bridges

acknowledged, an educated guess.
Further, the driving pattern and "fidgeting" of the occupants adds nothing that
supports reasonable suspicion.

As part of its analysis, the district court found it

significant that Mr. McPeak "slowed to 15 miles an hour in a 35 miles an hour zone,
turned the corner and slowed to five miles an hour and actually stopped." (Tr., p.52,
L.13 - p.54, L.11.) How exactly this is suspicious is not entirely clear. Vehicles slow
down and stop for many reasons - for instance, they could be lost, have reached their
destination, or need to turn around.
In State v. Morgan, an officer conducted a traffic stop after observing the
defendant make four left-hand turns, believing that the driver may be trying to avoid him.
State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109 (2013). The Idaho Supreme Court held,

The police officer's suspicion of Morgan was based primarily on a series of
four left-hand turns that Morgan made. Although the officer stated that he
believed Morgan may have been trying to avoid him, the officer provided
no factual justification for that belief. Absent other circumstances, driving
around the block on a Friday night does not rise to the level of specific,
articulable facts that justify an investigatory stop.
Id. at 112. All Mr. McPeak did was slow down and stop. This is not suspicious, and it is

certainly not indicative of a person seeking to avoid detection; he could clearly be seen
easier stopped on the road than he could be driving at 35 miles per hour. As in Morgan,
Officer Bridges provided no factual justification for his belief that slowing down and
stopping was suspicious.
Finally, the movement in the vehicle did not give rise to reasonable suspicion. It
is difficult to determine how fidgeting in a vehicle makes it more likely that the occupants
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had been involved in an assault. There was no evidence presented that the individuals
could have been concealing or destroying evidence, and again, the number of people in
the vehicle was different than the number provided by dispatch; only one suspect was
identified.
Therefore, the district court erred by concluding that Officer Bridges had
reasonable, articulable suspicion sufficient to initiate a traffic stop. All of the evidence
seized as a result of the illegal traffic stop must be excluded as fruit of the poisonous
tree.

See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-485 (1963); State v.

Schrecengost, 134 Idaho 547, 549 (Ct. App. 2000).

11.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing Excessive Sentences

A.

Introduction
Mr. McPeak asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing

excessive sentences for burglary and possession of methamphetamine.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing Excessive Sentences
Mr. McPeak asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentences of

ten years, with three years fixed, for burglary, and seven years indeterminate for
possession of methamphetamine, are excessive. Where a defendant contends that the
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See

State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
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The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence."'

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. McPeak does not allege that
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.

Accordingly, in order to show an abuse

of discretion, Mr. McPeak must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence
was excessive considering any view of the facts.

Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120

Idaho 141, 145 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385
(1992))). The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection
of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v.

Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Coassolo, 136
Idaho 138 (2001))).
At the sentencing hearing, Mr. McPeak explained the events that gave rise to
the charges in this case. He stated that Kevin Marsh had stolen tools out of his truck
and so he went to the Marsh residence to look for him. (Sent. Tr., p.39, Ls.1-15.) He
banged on the door, went in the house, and yelled for Kevin's wife, Angela.

(Sent.

Tr., p.39, Ls.1-15.) He and Angela argued and he told her that Kevin had stolen the
tools and was on his way home; he asked that she tell him when Kevin returned. (Sent.
Tr., p.39, Ls.1-15.)

He then left without touching her or stealing anything.

(Sent.

Tr., p.39, Ls.1-15.)
Once Kevin returned home they called the police and Mr. McPeak got pulled
over. (Sent Tr., p.39, Ls.16-25.) Mr. McPeak stated that Kevin and Angela lied to the
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police about what happened. (Sent. Tr., p.40, Ls.1-9.) When he got pulled over, both of
his passengers had drugs and pipes on them and never got charged; he was charged
simply because drugs were found in the truck. (Sent. Tr., p.40, Ls.10-20.) Since he
had been in jail, his brother had been released from jail and had taken his truck and
equipment and got it stolen while out doing drug deals. (Sent. Tr., p.41, Ls.1-9.)
Mr. McPeak acknowledged that he lost his temper and was sorry.

(Sent

Tr., p.41, Ls.10-13.) He then read a letter that he wrote for Ms. Marsh. (Sent. Tr., p.41,
L.16 - p.42, L.4.) He apologized for entering her house and acknowledged that he had
no right to yell at her or bring distress to her home. (Sent Tr., p.41, Ls.16-25.)
Mr. McPeak stated that his brother, who was in the vehicle with him when he
got pulled over, was a drug addict and that the drugs found in the truck belonged to his
brother, yet Mr. McPeak was still convicted. (Sent. Tr., p.43, Ls.14-22.) Mr. McPeak
stated that he did not drink, smoke or use alcohol. (Sent. Tr., p.43, Ls.22-25.)
Prior to his arrest, Mr. McPeak was the owner of both Eagle Carpets and Jazz
Products. (PSI, p.16.) He had been a quality control officer for 15 years at General
Motors in Flint, Michigan.

(PSI, p.16.)

Mr. McPeak also earned a journeyman's

certification in California and was a "union-trained remodel expert." (PSI, p.16.) His job
skills consisted of baking, building maintenance, flooring, lawn care, plumbing, and
remodeling homes. (PSI, p.16.) At the sentencing hearing, Mr. McPeak informed the
court that his wife had told him that "the phone is ringing off the hook with people
begging me to come to work." (Sent. Tr., p.46, Ls.15-23.) His wife had a place for him
to stay if he was released. (Sent. Tr., p.46, Ls.15-23.)

13

Mr. McPeak apologized to Ms. Marsh, acknowledged that he lost his temper,
and acknowledged that he should not have entered her home.

Considering that

Mr. McPeak acknowledged his anger issues and that he should not have disturbed
Ms. Marsh that evening, as well as the fact that he had been a productive member of
society and was employable upon his release, Mr. McPeak asserts that the district court
abused its discretion by imposing excessive sentences for burglary and possession of
methamphetamine.

CONCLUSION
Mr. McPeak respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
denying his motion to suppress and vacate his judgment of conviction. Alternatively, he
requests that this Court reduce his sentences as it deems appropriate or remand his
case for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 18th day of February, 2014.

JUSTIN M.
TIS
Deput/~!-~~ppellate Public Defender
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